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Abstract 
Besley, Hall, and Preston (1999) estimated a model of the demand for private health 
insurance in Britain as a function of regional waiting lists and found that increases in 
the number of people waiting for more than 12 months (the long-term waiting list) 
increased the probability of insurance purchase. In the absence of waiting time data, 
the length of regional long-term waiting lists was used to capture the price-quality 
trade-off of public treatment. We revisit Besley et al.’s analysis using Australian data 
and test the use of waiting lists as a proxy for waiting time in models of insurance 
demand. Unlike Besley et al., we find that the long-term waiting list is not a significant 
determinant of the demand for insurance. However we find that long waiting times do 
significantly increase insurance. This suggests that the relationship between waiting 




Keywords: waiting time, waiting lists, health insurance, regional aggregation 
 Demand for PHI 
Disinvestment 
Demand for PHI 
Demand for PHI 
Disinvestment 
1  Introduction 
Admission via a waiting list is commonly used as a rationing device for non-
emergency procedures in the healthcare sector where public services are free. In 
OECD countries where waiting lists are used, average waiting times for procedures 
often exceed six months (Siciliani and Hurst, 2003). Delays in medical treatment can 
prolong suffering, decrease earning capacity, and cause deterioration in quality of 
life. It is hypothesised that consumers buy private health insurance (PHI) covering 
private inpatient care, to give them the option to receive treatment as a private 
patient and avoid long delays associated with free treatment (Colombo and Tapay, 
2004; Harmon and Nolan, 2001).
1 Private insurance smooths income by reducing 
large, unexpected, out-of-pocket costs at the point of purchase of private treatment. 
A seminal paper that supports this hypothesis is Besley, Hall, and Preston (1999).  
BHP estimated a model of demand for PHI using a sample of British 
individuals over the period 1986–1991. Insurance demand is modelled as a function 
of individual characteristics and regional waiting list variables: the total inpatient 
waiting list and the long term list. The long-term waiting list was defined as the 
number of individuals (per thousand of the population) who had been on the waiting 
list for at least 12 months. On average the long term waiting list accounted for 20% of 
the total waiting list. Controlling for household income and other demographics and 
the size of the total waiting list, BHP predicted the insurance rate to increase by 2% 
per additional long-term patient (per thousand population). This finding has been 
interpreted as indicating that the demand for private treatment is responsive to the 
quality of public health care. The result has been used to support arguments for 
subsidising PHI in order to shift the health care burden to the private sector and 
reduce public hospital waiting times (Siciliani and Hurst, 2003, 2005). In fact, 
between 1997 and 2000, the Australian government embraced this strategy to 
reduce public hospitals’ waiting times (Willcox et al., 2007; Duckett 2005). Other 
researchers have interpreted BHP’s result as indicating a role of the public health 
system in producing better quality health care in the private sector (Bethencourt and 
Galasso, 2008). 
In this paper, we use Australian data to replicate the BHP analysis and test 
the usefulness of waiting lists as a proxy for waiting time. We use administrative data 
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on planned admissions to New South Wales (NSW) public hospitals during the period 
2004-2005. This data contains information on patient-level waiting times and can be 
used to construct regional waiting time and waiting list data. Using information on 
residential postcode, regional waiting time and list variables are combined with 
individual data on insurance status and socio-demographic characteristics from the 
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) data set year 
2005/2006. Our use of Area Health Services (AHS) for waiting list and waiting time 
variables corresponds to the use of regional health authorities by BHP. In the 
insurance models we include similar controls to those used by BHP in their model of 
individually-purchased health insurance demand.  
It is potentially misleading to use waiting lists and waiting times 
interchangeably. Cullis and Jones (2000) state that “(m)any have examined numbers 
on lists rather than average time (or the distribution of time) spent on lists. But it is 
the latter factor which affects the behaviour of demanders or their agents” [p.1229]. 
Waiting time statistics based on treated patients have been found more accurate 
than those derived from waiting lists, where longer waiting time are likely to be over 
represented due to overlaps between census dates (Godden and Pollock, 2008; 
Dixon and Siciliani, 2009). The two measures can move in different directions 
(Siciliani, 2008), or be independent of each other (Newton et al., 1995). For example, 
in England, the NHS waiting list declined steadily (from more than 1.2 million in 1997 
to 1 million in 2002 and to just 800,000 patients in 2004) while the average waiting 
times remained relatively stable (NHS, 2009; Appleby, 2005). Waiting times fell only 
when the British government introduced policies on maximum waiting times (Willcox 
et al., 2007). In contrast, in Australia additions to the waiting lists steadily increased 
from 584,000 in 2000 to over 740,000 in 2007/2008, but the median waiting times 
remained relatively stable at about one month (AIHW, 2000; 2004; 2006; 2008).
2  
Consistent with the BHP results, we find that the long-term waiting list is 
positively related to demand for private health insurance, but it is never statistically 
significant. In contrast, we find that long waiting times significantly increase insurance 
demand. Specifically, insurance demand is sensitive to the upper tail of the waiting 
time distribution, as measured by the 90
th percentile waiting time.  These findings 
have policy implications beyond the testing of a previous result. First, they show that 
waiting lists and waiting times do not necessarily measure the same phenomena. 
Second, our analysis suggests that the impact of waiting time on PHI demand is 
                                                 
2 Hanning (2002) suggests that additions to the waiting list measure demand.   Demand for PHI 
more modest than suggested by BHP. This result is consistent with previous studies 
which find a weak relationship between demand, supply, and waiting times (Martin 
and Smith, 1999, 2003; Goddard and Tavakoli, 1998). Johar et al. (2010) estimate 
the effect of individual waiting time and PHI demand and also find no effect of 
expected waiting time at the individual level. The lack of responsiveness of PHI 
demand to waiting times suggests that proposals to control waiting times through the 
private health insurance market are unlikely to be successful. Heterogenous motives 
of insurance purchase may be a factor that weakens the relationship between waiting 
time and insurance. 
2  LITERATURE 
There is only one previous study that uses waiting times, instead of waiting 
lists, to predict PHI demand. Jofre-Bonet (2000) use the Spanish National Health 
Survey and construct waiting time for respondents who were on the waiting list and 
were admitted during the study period. Individual waiting times are then aggregated 
to province-level. Consistent with BHP, the study found a large effect of waiting time 
on the insurance decision. She finds the probability of PHI purchase increases by 
0.3-0.4 percentage points for an additional 15 days of waiting. This result however is 
significant only at the 10% level and is sensitive to model specification and sample 
selection. In particular, a highly significant result is found only when the respondent is 
not a household head (i.e., they are likely to be beneficiaries rather than the 
purchaser of the insurance). In addition, in-sample calculations of waiting times can 
be problematic if the hospitalised population is different from the general population; 
some illnesses will be over- or under-represented in the general population data.  
  King and Mossialos (2005) update the BHP analysis using 1997–1999 NHS 
data. To measure long wait, they used the proportion of patients waiting over 6 
months for an inpatient stay. They find that long waiting time influences individually-
purchased health insurance decisions but not employer-financed insurance 
decisions. They find that a 1% increase in long wait was associated with a 4% 
increase in the odds-ratio of insurance purchase.   
  Other studies, which do not have waiting list data, rely on measures of 
perceived quality of public hospitals (Costa-Font and Font-Vilalta, 2004; Costa and 
Garcia, 2003). Costa and Garcia (2003) use expressed satisfaction with the public 
system and find that perceived lower quality increases the probability of purchasing 
PHI in Catalonia. At the mean, public care quality was perceived to be 2 index points 
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(on a scale of 1 to 10) lower than private care. Holding quality of public care constant, 
they find that a 10% improvement in private care over public care (i.e., less than one 
index point increase) would increase the number of insured people by 8.4%. In 
Ireland, (Harmon and Nolan, 2001) find that insurees are concerned about long 
waiting times. Asking some 1,100 insurees their reasons for having health insurance, 
86% rate ‘[b]eing sure of getting into hospital quickly when you need treatment’ as 
very important. They also find that accessibility is the most important factor 
motivating insurance purchase.  
  Other studies identified the cost of waiting through willingness to pay for 
quicker admissions. There is a cost in waiting as a good is worth less today if its 
consumption is delayed (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984). Using a stated preference 
technique, which asked respondents their most likely action in a hypothetical 
scenario described by attributes, Leung et al. (2004) find that patients who value time 
highly choose private treatment that is readily accessible and are prepared to pay to 
reduce waiting time to treatment. Propper (1990; 1995) and Johannesson et al. 
(1998) also find evidence that individuals are willing to pay non-trivial amounts to 
avoid waiting for medical treatment.  
  There is no consensus in the literature on whether waiting lists can be used 
as a proxy for waiting times. Waiting lists may reflect advances in technology that 
permit more procedures to be done in a given time; population growth and changes 
in demographic composition may lead to increased demand for particular treatments 
(e.g., old-age related diseases); political pressure may focus on reducing the number 
of individuals waiting beyond a specified time without reducing overall waits. Sobolev 
et al. (2004) find a positive association between list length and waiting time, 
especially when the waiting list is long.
3 Sobolev et al. (2006) has similar findings 
among patients queuing for coronary artery bypass surgery: a very long list (over 60 
patients) can lead to delays in treatment of a magnitude of three to four times the 
waiting time of the shortest list (0-14 patients). On the other hand, there are plausible 
reasons why the size of the waiting list may not relate to access to treatment. For 
example, perception of a long waiting list may deter patients and physicians from 
initiating surgical treatment and so deter patients from entering the waiting list. Also a 
long list does not translate to a long wait if patients are processed quickly.  
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  Siciliani (2008) shows that the waiting list is a different concept to waiting time 
and these two variables can move in different directions. He uses two concepts of 
demand: potential demand, which is the addition to the waiting list if there is no 
waiting time, and current demand, which is affected by both potential demand and 
current waiting time. If supply grows faster than the potential demand, both waiting 
time and the waiting list would fall in the short run as supply is higher, but in the long 
run, the increasing supply will induce higher demand, which implies a higher stock of 
patients on the waiting list. Waiting time however may still be falling. Several studies 
have found that the waiting list can remain constant while waiting times improve. 
Using Canadian administrative data on several surgical procedures ranging from 
coronary artery bypass graft to knee replacement, DeCoster et al. (1999) find that 
while the waiting list increased, waiting times for these procedures remained stable, 
or reduced. Martin et al. (2003) find no evidence that long waits are linked to hospital 
capacity, which determines queues. Newton et al. (1995) use seven-year quarterly 
data from the English National Health System and find evidence of a dynamic effect, 
in which increased admissions improve waiting times but
  the list size remains 
unchanged because the list expands at the same time. 
3  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This study uses two sets of data: hospital administrative data for waiting times 
also used to construct waiting lists, and a national household survey containing 
insurance information and socio-demographic controls. The hospital data are derived 
from inpatient episodes and matched waiting time data from public hospitals in NSW 
consisting of patients waiting for planned procedures who completed their hospital 
stay between period 1/07/2004 and 30/06/2005. It records the date the patient was 
placed on the hospital’s waiting list by the specialist (listing date)
4 and the admission 
date of the patient to the hospital (removal date). The patient waiting time is defined 
as the duration between listing and removal dates. For the individual data we use the 
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey for the year 
2005/2006. HILDA is a panel study of Australian households. It contains information 
on private health insurance holding, income, education, and household 
characteristics. The HILDA data are linked with the hospital data through postcode of 
residence of observations in the HILDA sample.  
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  Waiting lists are counts at a specific date. The waiting list is “backward 
looking” as it captures patients who entered the waiting list at time (t – k) (where k =1, 
2, …) and remained untreated at time t. To construct waiting lists from our hospital 
data, we define a census date. We specify 1/07/2004 as the census date, so the 
waiting list is the count of patients, admitted during 2004-05, who are on the list at the 
end of June 2004. All patients in our data listed after 1/07/2004 are excluded from the 
constructed waiting lists. For consistency with waiting lists constructed from 
aggregate data, which are unlikely to contain information about patient’s 
characteristics, we place no restrictions on age, payment status, and citizenship 
status of the patients on the waiting list.
5 Table 1 shows the distribution of the waiting 
list by listing year and admission year. The earliest listing year is 1996. The table 
shows that a large majority of listed patients get admitted quickly and that the 
proportion of patients treated during 2004-05 declines with duration on the list.
6 
Almost 90% of patients were admitted within a year of listing date. This suggests that 
potential bias from omission of patients on the list on the census date who were 
admitted to hospital after the period of our data (30/06/2005) is minimal. In total, 
there are about 60,000 people on the waiting list, and this figure is consistent with 
that reported by the government’s Audit Office (NSW Audit Office, 2003). 
We undertake our analysis for 16 Area Health Services (AHS) and 575 
postcodes within NSW.
7 The aggregation by AHS is comparable to the regional 
health authorities used by BHP. On average, there are about 9 patients on the 
waiting list per thousand of population and 1 patient on the long-term waiting list per 
thousand of population. The mean waiting time is 83 days. In constructing the waiting 
time variables by AHS, we include all patients in the hospital data because this gives 
the most accurate measures of waiting times. 
The insurance variable from the HILDA data is binary, taking a value of 1 if an 
individual has private hospital cover, and 0 otherwise. The mean insurance rate is 
53%, which is higher than the national average (45%). We control for the effect of 
                                                 
5 The only exclusion is of patients who were admitted but whose status is classified as “not ready 
for care”. Further examination of these observations reveals that the majority were admitted for 
renal dialysis. 
6 Dixon and Siciliani (2009) suggest an alternative way to infer the distribution of waiting list 
given the distribution of waiting time. Using their approach, we find that the proportion of 
patients on the long-term list (on the waiting list for more than 12 months) was close to zero (less 
than 0.3%). This is because the bulk of patients in NSW are treated within a year with a mean 
waiting time of around 80 days.  
7 The HILDA data contains no observations from postcodes in the most remote AHS, Far West. 
This AHS is therefore excluded from our analysis.    Demand for PHI 
socio-demographic variations on PHI demand by including covariates similar to those 
used by BHP in their model of individually-purchased insurance.  
BHP can include hospital characteristics of health region because they use 
repeated cross section data for 5 years. They find that hospital expenditures and staff 
characteristics are not significant predictors of insurance demand. In this paper, with 
a single year of data we control for differences in supply-side variables by including 
dummy variables for area remoteness. Detailed data definitions and summary 
statistics of all variables are in the Appendix. The HILDA sample size is 2,315 adult 
individuals (aged 18 or older).  
Table 2 presents means of all variables in the insurance demand model and 
Table 3 reports insurance rates and waiting list and time variables by AHS. The 
insurance rate is 52.7% and varies quite widely by AHS from 29% in Macquarie to 
78% in Northern Sydney. On average there are 9.4 and 1.0 person per ‘000 
population on the total and long term waiting list respectively. Waiting list variables 
exhibit wide variation by AHS. For example, in two of the sixteen AHSs (Central 
Coast and Mid Western), there are 2 patients per thousand population on the long 
term list, whilst in all other areas the long term list is smaller. In three AHSs 10% of 
patients waited less than 4 months to be admitted, whilst 10% of patients in four 
AHSs waited at least 6 months to be admitted. The average waiting time is 82.7 days 
and 5.3% have waits in excess of one year. The longest mean waiting time is 127 
days and in this AHS 10% wait more than 1 year.  The average wait at the 90
th 
percentile is 145 days, and this varies markedly by AHS, from 72 days in Northern 
Sydney to 272 days in Illawarra.  
Long-term waiting lists are positively and significantly correlated with the 
proportion of long wait (correlation coefficient of 0.75 (p-value=0.05), whilst there is 
no significant pairwise positive relationship between waiting lists and any of the 
waiting time variables. Pairwise correlations among the waiting time variables are, of 
course, positive, high and significant.  
4  RESULTS 
Table 4 presents probit models of insurance choice. We present results from 
5 independent models with varying covariates of the waiting list and time variables. 
Model 1 presents results that are comparable BHP’s results with total waiting lists 
and long-term waiting lists per ‘000 of the area’s population included as regressors. 
     7    Demand for PHI 
Models 2 to 5 present results from alternative models, including different 
combinations of waiting list and waiting time variables.   
     The results in model 1 are consistent with those of BHP: insurance demand is 
negatively related to the total list and positively related to long-term lists. Neither of 
these two variables however is statistically significant. In their model of individual (not 
employment-based) insurance, BHP report a t-statistic of 1.84 for the long-term 
waiting list variable, which appears to be calculated based on standard errors of 
estimates that are not corrected for clustering. In our models, we report clustered 
standard errors which are larger than the uncorrected standard errors, as is 
commonly found (Moulton, 1990; Bertrand, 2004). However, even with uncorrected 
standard errors the long-term waiting list variable is not significant (t =1.09).  
In model 2 we add waiting time variables: mean waiting time (Mean wait) and 
the proportion of patients whose waiting time exceeded 12 months (Long wait). Long 
wait is similar in spirit to the idea of long-term waiting lists, that is, it captures the 
upper tail of the waiting time distribution. The coefficient on Long wait is positive and 
significant at 5% level, indicating that the probability of private health insurance 
purchase increases with the upper tail of the waiting time distribution. This suggests 
that long waiting times, and not long waiting lists, matter for insurance demand.  
In model 3, we test an alternative variable to capture the upper tail of the 
waiting time distribution: the waiting time of the upper 10% of the patient distribution 
(P 90
th wait). We find consistent results with Long wait, but the impact of this variable 
is more precisely estimated.  At the mean of all variables, a 7 day increase in the P 
90
th wait increases the probability of buying insurance by 0.03 percentage points (6% 
of the mean insurance rate).  
In the last two models, 4 and 5, we omit both waiting lists variables but 
retained the waiting time variables. Long wait is no longer significant but P 90
th wait is 
still highly significant. An explanation for this change of result is the correlation of 
Long wait with the long-term waiting list. One needs to control for the size of the long-
term waiting list to isolate the effect of Long wait. Using the Bayesian Information 
Criterion, the preferred model is model 5. In this model, a 7-day increase in the P 90
th 
wait increases the probability of buying insurance by 0.02 percentage points (4% of 
the mean insurance rate).  
     8    Demand for PHI 
     9  
While measures of long waiting time suggest a positive relationship with 
private insurance demand, the average waiting time (Mean wait) tends to lower 
insurance demand. Computing the marginal effects of Mean wait, we find that they 
are larger in magnitude than those of the long wait variables suggesting that the 
overall effect of waiting time on insurance demand is quite small (due to the 
counteracting effects of average and long waiting time), or even negative.
8 Waiting 
time variables move together, however for small increases, long waiting time may 
increase without changing the average wait.   
The coefficients of individual characteristics are stable across models. The probability 
of insurance purchase increases with income, education, and age. Those who are affected by 
the Medicare Levy Surcharge (MLS), which penalises high-income earners for not having 
private health insurance, are, as we expected, more likely to buy insurance. Home owners and 
people living in the cities are also more likely to have health insurance. On the other hand, 
households with small children and larger households are shown to be less likely to buy 
insurance. As we have controlled for age and household income, household composition may 
capture other determinants of the insurance decision that relate to tastes or availability of 
other smoothing mechanisms besides insurance. 
  
                                                 
8 We are not suggesting that the effects of average wait and long waiting time should be added 
together. However, to illustrate our point, let ρ  be the regression coefficient of a simple 
regression of long waiting time on average waiting time. In the data, ρ = 2.4. We can rewrite an 
insurance model as a function of just one the variable (say, average waiting time). The coefficient 
of the average waiting time will be the sum of its own effect and the effect of long waiting time, 
scaled by ρ. Our estimation results (model 5) find that the first term is negative and the second 
term is smaller positive, but would have to be scaled up by ρ. The resulting coefficient is very 
small due to the counteracting effects.     Demand for PHI 
5  DISCUSSION 
Anecdotal evidence from many countries suggests that waiting times for 
elective procedures in public hospitals motivate people to purchase PHI to access 
private treatment. However there is very little empirical evidence for this using waiting 
time data. In the absence of waiting times, the size of public hospital waiting lists and 
particularly the list of those waiting more than 12 months, has been used as a proxy 
for waiting times in models of insurance demand. 
Probably the most influential paper is Besley et al. (1999) which finds large 
impacts on insurance purchase from reducing the long term list. This has resulted in 
recommendations to introduce policies to increase private insurance cover to reduce 
public hospital waiting times. Australia introduced such a policy, a 30% premium 
subsidy, in 1999 with the aim of reducing pressure on the public hospital system. 
There have been recommendations for similar policies in the UK (Siciliani, 2008).   
The main objective of this paper has been to test the usefulness of waiting 
lists as a proxy for waiting time in relation to demand for private health insurance. 
Unlike BHP, we do not find that the long list is a significant determinant of demand for 
insurance. However we find that long waiting times do significantly increase 
insurance. This suggests that the relationship between waiting times and waiting lists 
is not as straightforward as is commonly assumed.  
The large impact on individual PHI purchase of the long waiting list in the 
BHP results is only marginally significant, and the significance may not be robust to 
standard error corrections for clustering by regional health authority and year. 
Furthermore, a close examination of the BHP analysis suggests that their results may 
not reflect a systematic long-run relationship between PHI purchase and the size of a 
long-term waiting list. In the model with time and area fixed effects, it seems that 
BHP’s identification of the long-term list effect relies on the presence of areas where 
long-term waiting lists change faster than  average . As such, their model predicts 
that people’s insurance decisions depend on relative changes in long-term waiting 
lists, i.e. people would drop their insurance coverage if their area’s long-term waiting 
list decreased by more days than in other areas. This co-variation is different from 
the relationship between the level of the waiting list and PHI coverage. 
Also, the analysis of BHP could be sensitive to data construction. In the final 
year of BHP’s analysis (1991), there was a large fall in the long-term waiting list, 
which had been stable in the previous 5 years (1986-1990). In addition, the insurance 
rate, which had been  trending upwards since the beginning of the study period, 
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reaching its highest level in 1990, also fell in 1991. If most of the changes in the area-
level waiting list and insurance coverage used to identify the effect of the waiting list 
on insurance occurred around this time, it is possible that BHP’s results are sensitive 
to their choice of study period. A policy shock which lead to  a shorter long-term 
waiting list, could drive the positive relationship found between the long-term waiting 
list and the insurance rate.  
Our finding, that that long waiting times increase the demand for insurance, 
should be interpreted with caution because the relationship between waiting times 
and insurance demand is complex. The negative and significant impact of average 
waiting times tends to offset the effect of waiting times in the upper tail of the 
distribution. These measures are highly correlated so that policies that target the 
upper tail of the distribution will impact on the mean as well, with perhaps unintended 
impacts on insurance coverage.  
     11    Demand for PHI 
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Table 1: Waiting list observations by listing year and removal year 
 Admission  year 
List year   2004  2005  Total 
1996  1 0 1 
1997  1 1 2 
1998  1 3 4 
1999 9  26  35 
2000  44 20 64 
2001  184 108 292 
2002 1,167  590  1,757 
2003 9,677  4,119  13,796 
2004  33,590 8,030 41,620 
    44,674 12,987 57,661 
 
 
Table 2: Variable means 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.
Insurance  0.527 0.499
Total List   9.235 3.822
Long-term List   0.947 0.663
Mean wait   82.683 21.525
Long wait  0.053 0.025
P 90
th wait   145.277 52.453
Income  81.654 70.016
MLS  0.326 0.469
Postgraduate  0.049 0.216
Graduate  0.065 0.247
Undergraduate  0.146 0.353
Diploma  0.321 0.467
High School  0.108 0.311
Owner-occupier  0.690 0.462
Male  0.418 0.493
Age 30s  0.179 0.384
Age 40s  0.216 0.412
Age 50-65  0.273 0.446
Age 65+  0.201 0.401
Children  0.492 0.924
Adults  2.129 1.003
City  0.496 0.500
Inner region  0.362 0.481
Outer region  0.143 0.350
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Central  Coast  158  0.544  14.560 2.566  96.842 0.089  197 
Central  Sydney  154 0.591 6.862  0.601  63.848  0.036 99 
Greater  Murray  96  0.385 9.723  0.740  85.173  0.048 147 
Hunter  247 0.449 6.697  0.416  68.791  0.032 109 
Illawarra  169 0.556 15.205  1.820  127.001  0.099 272 
Macquarie  45  0.289  13.705 1.259  82.775 0.044  132 
Mid North Coast  106  0.406  14.716  1.319  116.342  0.082  231 
Mid  Western  89  0.382  14.622 2.146  78.893 0.057  125 
New  England  105  0.381  13.425 0.500  71.506 0.024  130 
Northern  Rivers  148 0.412 4.800  0.578  96.141  0.074 150 
Northern  Sydney  275 0.775 4.522  0.241  46.308  0.019 72 
South Eastern 
Sydney 
241 0.614 6.629  0.793  79.477  0.056 136 
South Western 
Sydney 
162 0.506 11.225  1.246  103.908  0.074 180 
Southern  77  0.442  10.588 0.371  80.468 0.023  146 
Wentworth  88  0.466 6.985  1.062  87.689  0.057 134 
Western  Sydney  155 0.594 7.597  0.680  78.681  0.044 134 
Total  2135  0.527 9.235  0.947  82.601  0.053 145 
 
 Disinvestment 
Table 4: Probit coefficients with waiting list variables 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Waiting       
Total List   -0.008 0.049  -0.046*     
  (-0.38) (1.47)  (-1.73)    
Long-term List   0.068 -0.327  0.126    
  (0.57) (-1.45)  (1.01)    
Mean wait    -0.019**  -0.026***  -0.007  -0.019*** 
    (-2.23) (-3.54) (-1.46) (-2.91) 
Long wait    17.83**   5.979   
   (2.15)   (1.37)   
P 90
th wait    0.012***   0.008*** 
    (3.42)   (2.86) 
Individual       
Income  0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
  (5.46) (5.33) (5.39) (5.31) (5.54) 
MLS  0.270** 0.282** 0.276** 0.277** 0.265** 
  (2.11) (2.21) (2.19) (2.17) (2.10) 
Postgraduate  0.510*** 0.498*** 0.500*** 0.501*** 0.516*** 
  (3.14) (3.03) (3.04) (3.07) (3.15) 
Graduate  0.476*** 0.474*** 0.474*** 0.474*** 0.492*** 
  (3.21) (3.18) (3.18) (3.20) (3.30) 
Undergraduate  0.715*** 0.708*** 0.716*** 0.710*** 0.725*** 
  (6.74) (6.62) (6.70) (6.66) (6.83) 
Diploma  0.129* 0.134* 0.129* 0.131* 0.135* 
  (1.80) (1.87) (1.80) (1.82) (1.89) 
High School  0.088 0.096 0.092 0.091 0.099 
  (0.75) (0.82) (0.80) (0.77) (0.85) 
Owner-occupier  0.605*** 0.621*** 0.618*** 0.613*** 0.602*** 
  (7.29) (7.45) (7.45) (7.32) (7.18) 
Male  -0.066  -0.0627 -0.0654 -0.0637 -0.068 
  (-1.46) (-1.39) (-1.44) (-1.41) (-1.49) 
Age 30s  0.254** 0.249** 0.258** 0.252** 0.263** 
  (2.25) (2.22) (2.27) (2.23) (2.32) 
Age 40s  0.299** 0.307***  0.297** 0.301** 0.305** 
  (2.49) (2.58) (2.46) (2.51) (2.54) 
Age 50-65  0.650*** 0.646*** 0.648*** 0.651*** 0.653*** 
  (5.38) (5.39) (5.42) (5.38) (5.41) 
Age 65+  0.630*** 0.624*** 0.617*** 0.626*** 0.637*** 
  (4.62) (4.60) (4.52) (4.57) (4.63) 
Nm children  -0.118** -0.112** -0.121** -0.114** -0.122** 
  (2.30) (2.21) (2.35) (2.24) (2.36) 
Nm adults  -0.139*** -0.140*** -0.136*** -0.137*** -0.140*** 
7  (3.26) (3.26) (3.28) (3.17) (3.37) 
Inner region  -0.341*** -0.313*** -0.255**  -0.319*** -0.297*** 
  (-3.67) (-3.42) (-2.64) (-3.55) (-3.33) 
Outer region  -0.291** -0.289** -0.125  -0.252** -0.271** 
  (-2.33) (-2.29) (-0.93) (-2.30) (-2.53) 
Constant -1.160***  -0.683**  -0.464* -0.911***  -0.732*** 













Note: t statistics in parenthesis based on standard errors corrected for clustering by postcodes. The 
sample size is 2315. *, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.    Demand for PHI 
Appendix:   Waiting time and patient characteristics  
Variable   Definition  Mean  Std.Dev
Waiting           
Total List   Count of patients on the public hospitals 
waiting list per ‘000 population on 
1/7/2004 
9.235 3.822 
Long-term List   Count of patients listed for 12 months or 
more per ‘000 population on 1/7/2004 
0.947 0.663 
Mean wait   Mean waiting time of all patients  82.601  21.377 
P 90
th wait   90
th percentile of waiting time  145.277  52.453 
Long wait  % of patients waiting more than 12 
months  
0.053 0.025 
Insurance       
Insurance  =1 if have PHI  0.527  0.499 
Demographic      
Male  =1 if male  0.418  0.493 
Income  Household annual gross income ($’000)  81.654  70.016 
Nm children  Number of children  0.492  0.924 
MLS  =1 if affected by the Medicare Levy 
Surcharge 
0.326 0.469 
Nm adults  Number of persons aged 15+  2.129  1.003 
Owner-occupier  =1 if owned house/currently paying off 
mortgage 
0.690 0.462 
Education      
Postgrad  =1 if education is postgraduate level  0.049  0.216 
Grad  =1 if education is graduate diploma  0.065  0.247 
Undergrad  =1 if education is undergraduate  0.146  0.353 
Dip  =1 if education is diploma/certificate III-
IV 
0.321 0.467 
HS  =1 if education is high school  0.108  0.311 
Incomplete  =1 if education is less than high school 
(base) 
0.310 0.462 
Age      
Age <30  =1 if age 18-29 years (base)  0.130  0.336 
Age 30s  =1 if age 30-39 years  0.179  0.384 
Age 40s  =1 if age 40-49 years  0.216  0.412 
Age 50-65  =1 if age 50-65 years  0.273  0.446 
Age 65+  =1 if age >65 years  0.201  0.401 
Area      
City  =1 if live in city (base)  0.496  0.500 
Inner region  =1 if live in inner NSW postcodes   0.362  0.481 
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